Soviet reunion?
The Russian policy in the former-USSR countries has become more active in the recent weeks. One of the reasons for this is the effect of the coming anniversary. In December, all former members of the Soviet Union will celebrate their “civilized divorce” and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As usual, the bureaucratic logic implies that such a jubilee must be marked with numerous top-level events and “achievements” associated with them.
However, in all seriousness, Russia is trying to benefit from the opening window of opportunities. First of all, it is obvious that after 20 years of existence the CIS has exhausted its potential and should either be disbanded or seriously transformed. In the last four years this amorphous community eventually lost its major purpose – to be a forum for bilateral meetings with the Russian president. Relations with Belarus and Georgia soured, Kyrgyzstan was preoccupied with internal strife, Ukraine and Uzbekistan continued their pendulous policy, Armenia and Azerbaijan became disillusioned about the prospects of Moscow’s mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict… As a result, even ritual presence at the CIS summits was considered a burden by some presidents. The potential return of Vladimir Putin as Russian president puts some value back into the CIS as a communication platform.
Secondly, the Russian political system is stabilized for another six or more years. So now Moscow can afford to perform more complicated and risky tasks at the international arena and notably in the former Soviet space. The recent emergence of the Eurasian Union concept indicates such ambitions. Russia has always claimed for significant role in the global leadership, but was lacking in areas for power projection. Europe seems reluctant to support Russia’s initiatives – from the European Security Treaty to common missile defense. The United States is on the run because of the presidential race and is focused on Afghanistan and the Middle East (and moreover, Washington does not plan to share its own global status with anyone else).
Developing a partnership with China does not imply joint self-assertion action – due to the difference in potentials and interests. Hence, the CIS with its generation of Soviet-educated leaders tied with common experience remains a natural zone for building up forces in support of Russian international claims.
Thirdly, Moscow cannot afford to lose momentum. Europe is dragged into internal economic turbulence and focused on saving the EU members from collapse. The United States has slightly weakened its interest in the FSU countries. And Russia has a good chance to offer its traditional partners (Kazakhstan and Belarus constitute the lion’s share of Russia’s trade with the CIS) the concept of a common economic space. And outside this integration nucleus others can join the Free Trade Zone established this week in St. Petersburg as a soft alternative to the WTO.
Nonetheless, there are three impediments. First is the difficulty of finding efficient compromises. One should not underestimate post-Soviet regimes – they have learned to defend their independence and national interests and will not easily be seduced by Russian “carrots”. Secondly, the existing starting level of economic interaction between Russia and its neighbors is extremely low. Trade turnover is about 14-15 per cent (and most of it is made by Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, and by supplies of oil and gas to them).
Finally, much will depend on the ability of Russian economy to bear these bonds – some Russian companies find it difficult to resist their competitors within the Customs Union and suffer from new agreements. Besides, the economic benefits of joining of such countries as Kyrgyzstan (or perhaps, Tajikistan in the future) are vague- in their cases Russia will have to pay the price of leadership in the integration alliance.
Thus, the time for revitalizing Russia’s relations with the neighbors is ripe. And even better is the fact that Russia has eventually designed a coherent strategy for integration and a model (with all its advantages and flaws) that it can try to sell to other countries of the former Soviet Union. Let’s see how the implementation goes.
Dmitry Polikanov, for RT